

**Can Social Democratic Parties Attract Left-Authoritarian Voters?
Simulation Results Depend on Modeling Party Positions**

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Abstract

Existing studies disagree on whether social democratic parties can attract left-authoritarian voters by adopting more restrictive stances on issues like immigration. In this paper, we assess potential electoral gains from such a shift in a simulation study. Using Dutch survey data on eight elections from 1994 to 2021, we estimate hypothetical election outcomes under the condition of the PvdA (Labour Party) shifting to the right on the issue of multiculturalism. We also make a methodological contribution by exploring how the simulation outcomes depend on objective versus subjective specification of party positions. The results show significant benefits from such a shift in some elections under the objective specification and no clear benefits under the subjective specification. Substantively, our findings align with inconclusive results regarding potential benefits from shifting to the right on immigration for social democratic parties. Methodologically, we demonstrate how the results of simulation studies depend on modeling specifications.

Keywords: ideological shifting, left-authoritarians, multiculturalism, Netherlands, representation, simulation, social democrats

An interesting finding in West European politics concerns the representation paradox in the two-dimensional political space. The new dimension of political competition based on culture rather than economics is now a persistent phenomenon in politics of industrial democracies (Albright 2010; Bornschier 2010; Delespaul 2025). The emergence and rise of the cultural conflict is usually attributed to a deep social division created by globalization (Kriesi et al. 2006). This new dimension is defined by cultural protectionism and attachment to the nation state—as opposed to universalism and international integration.

Interestingly, this new dimension of political ideology has more often been recognized and acknowledged by voters in contrast to the unidimensional focus of party politics that seeks to combine economic and cultural issues into the same spectrum (Bakker et al. 2015; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). Therefore, two different political spaces effectively exist in Western Europe—one for voters and one for parties—that are far from being perfectly congruent.

More specifically, West European parties usually take left-universalist or right-nationalist ideological positions whereas voters are spread more evenly across the two-dimensional political space. As a result, a large group of voters combining support for redistribution with preferences for cultural protectionism remain largely unrepresented by existing parties (Hillen and Steiner 2020; Lefkofridi et al. 2014). The phenomenon is normatively important because ideological congruence between voters and their representatives is usually seen as a cornerstone of a democratic polity (Ferland 2016; Thomassen 2012). A number of studies address how left-authoritarian or left-nationalist voters make choices under cross-pressure (Gidron 2022; Kurella and Rosset 2017; Steiner and Hillen 2021), and how poor representation affects their satisfaction with democracy and political engagement (Bakker et al. 2020; Hakhverdian and Schakel 2022).

Less attention in the literature has been paid to parties' strategies and potential effects of a shift to the left-authoritarian quadrant of the political space. A specific puzzle

in this regard concerns social democratic parties in West European countries. Research on electoral fortunes of the populist radical right parties suggests that the so-called “winning formula” includes the combination of strong opposition to multiculturalism with a moderate position on income redistribution (De Lange 2007; Muis and Scholte 2013). Given the decline of social democratic parties across Western Europe (Benedetto et al. 2020), a mirroring strategy that combines support for redistribution with a moderate stance on culture may seem attractive. While parties face obstacles in changing issue stances, such as potential backlash from their activists (Orhan 2025b), shifts are still possible via strategic changes in issue framing or dilution of current positions (Feddersen 2023; Vestergaard 2026). Nevertheless, with the notable exception of Denmark (Orhan 2025a; Rathgeb and Wolkenstein 2022), social democrats are reluctant to shift toward a more culturally protectionist position supported by the largest cross-section of voters (Akkerman 2015; Rooduijn et al. 2014).¹

Can social democratic parties improve their electoral results by shifting to the right on culture, or is current ideological inertia the right choice? Some evidence from cross-national observational studies suggests that, if anything, taking more authoritarian cultural positions is associated with lower electoral support for social democratic parties (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020; Polacko 2023). The main reason is that such shifts alienate existing social democratic voters without attracting other segments of the electorate (Arnesen et al. 2023; Lewandowsky and Wagner 2023). Moreover, when social democrats take more authoritarian positions on the issues of immigration and immigrant integration, that may ultimately benefit the radical right by legitimizing their political agenda in the eyes of the public (Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012). An implication is that the most

¹ An alternative view contends that the shift to the right occurs but affects entire national political systems—as a result, the relative position of social democratic parties is not changing (Van Spanje 2010).

promising electoral strategy for social democrats is to attract the votes of women, younger adults, and professionals rather than left-nationalists (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2019).

Importantly, most such studies consider cultural issues broadly—including, for instance LGBT rights and European integration—rather than immigration specifically. A paper focusing on the immigration issue, in turn, finds that social democratic parties benefit from adopting more restrictive positions (Spoon and Kluever 2020). Experimental studies addressing the same question also do not converge on a single answer. For instance, a study in Denmark demonstrates that by adopting a more restrictive position on immigration, social democrats can win over some nativist voters and improve overall performance of left-wing parties (Hjorth and Larsen 2022). There is also evidence that while the populist right voters across Europe do not compromise on the immigration issue, supporters of other parties are sometimes willing to do that (Kirkizh et al. 2023). A study in Germany, however, shows that in order to attract a significant number of voters who would otherwise support the radical right, the shift should be extreme enough to alienate an even larger share of pro-immigrant voters (Chou et al. 2021).

In this paper, we contribute to the literature by assessing potential gains of a social democratic party from shifting to a more assimilationist position on immigration using a different method: simulated election results. We take advantage of electoral data from the Netherlands that allow tracing positions of voters and parties on income redistribution and multiculturalism from 1994 to 2021. As a result, our analysis accounts for the full spatial distances between voters and parties on the two issues instead of simply relying on voters' relative positions. We use estimates from a conditional logit model to obtain hypothetical electoral outcomes under the scenario of the PvdA (Labour Party) shifting to the right on the issue of multiculturalism.

Our simulation has two different specifications that assume that parties' positions on political issues are, respectively, objective and subjective. Simulation results diverge

across the two specifications. Under the assumption of objective issue positions, a hypothetical shift to the right on multiculturalism shows significant increases in the PvdA vote share across elections. When parties' positions are assumed to be subjective, however, potential gains from the same shift are mostly insignificant and highly variable.

Substantively, our results show why previous studies may diverge in their assessments of social democrats' electoral strategies. Methodologically, we confirm that the results of simulation studies in electoral politics critically depend on modeling assumptions.

Simulating Party Shifts

The changes of parties' issue positions have been an important topic of research in political science (Adams 2012). Most prominently, scholars treat party shifts as the dependent variable and explore how they depend on electoral competitiveness (Abou-Chadi and Orłowski 2016), rivals' strategies (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009), voters' preferences (Ezrow et al. 2011), and party structure (Meyer and Wagner 2019). There has also been work on measuring and tracing party shifts over time (Adams et al. 2019; Dalton and McAllister 2015). Here, we treat party shifts as an independent variable and use the simulation approach to estimate their potential impact on election results.

Simulation modeling is a useful tool in political science that allows scholars to study how the outcomes of interest may change depending on the strategies adopted by relevant actors (Johnson 1999). Election results are an important class of political outcomes that depend on both structural factors and decisions of multiple actors thus making the simulation approach particularly attractive (Grofman 2016; Hoffman 2009). However, results of simulation studies—as it is the case with any other modeling approaches in the discipline—critically depend on the assumptions made by scholars (Mauerer and Tutz 2024; Pluemper and Traunmueller 2020). In the case of simulated electoral results, one of the most important sets of assumptions concerns the content of utility functions that

translate voters' demographic characteristics and issue positions into candidate and party choices (Quinn et al. 1999).

When simulating differences in parties' electoral fortunes depending on their policy shifts, one must specify how their issue positions are defined and calculated. Studies that take advantage of election surveys usually rely on voters' assessments of party positions. These assessments can be used to infer party positions via two distinct measurement strategies that have been used in the literature for more than 30 years. If parties are assumed to have objective issue positions, voters' assessments can be averaged to estimate them (MacDonald et al. 1991). Alternatively, researchers can use respondent-specific party positions and thus assume their subjective character (Westholm 1997).

There exist good arguments in favor of either objective or subjective definition of party positions. On the one hand, voters tend to perceive less issue differences between themselves and the parties they vote for—this phenomenon is known in political behavior as projection (Merrill et al. 2001). It means that models using subjective (voter-specific) party positions may overestimate the extent of issue-based voting at the expense of factors like voters' demographics. On the other hand, parties often use targeted appeals that may lead different groups of voters to develop dissimilar perceptions of their issue positions (Hersh and Schaffner 2013; Plescia and Staniek 2017; Wagner and Meyer 2023). Therefore, using objective (average) party positions may underestimate issue voting and inflate the importance of alternative explanations.

Since it is difficult to claim that one specification is better than the other, we use both of them and conduct two sets of simulations: one with average party positions and one with respondent-specific positions. This allows us to assess whether defining party issue positions as objective or subjective leads to diverging simulation results—and thus to different conclusions regarding potential gains from position shifts.

Data

For the simulation study, we use data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES). The DPES collects data on individual voters during elections to the House of Representatives, the lower chamber of parliament in the Netherlands. The 150 members of the lower chamber are elected using party-list proportional representation in a single constituency. There is no electoral threshold, so any party with at least one elected candidate gains representation in the parliament. Over the studied period, up to 15 parties from the radical left to the radical right were represented in the House of Representatives.²

The DPES is the only electoral study in Europe that started to ask respondents about spatial positions of parties and voters on both economic and cultural issues as early as in 1994 (Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Jansen et al. 2011). In our analysis, we use the issues of income differences and multiculturalism. There is a question on income differences: “Some people and parties think that the differences in incomes in our country should be increased. Others think that these differences should be decreased. Of course, there are also people whose opinion is somewhere in between. Where would you place [yourself/party X]?” A respondent has to choose a response from 1 = *Larger differences* to 7 = *Smaller differences*. The question regarding multiculturalism is: “Some people and parties think that these people should be able to live in the Netherlands while preserving all customs of their own culture. Others think that these people, if they stay in the Netherlands, should completely adjust themselves to Dutch culture. Of course, there are also people whose opinion is somewhere in between. Where would you place [yourself/party X]?” Response options range from 1 = *Preserve their own culture* to 7 = *Adapt to Dutch culture*. During eight elections—in 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017, and 2021—respondents and parties were positioned on both income differences dimension and multiculturalism

² For the full list of parties present in the analyzed data, see Table S1 in Supplementary Material.

dimension. The PvdA is generally positioned left-to-center on both dimensions, but the exact position estimates vary across elections (as well as across respondents).

Respondents' vote choices are self-reported and recorded as a nominal variable with unique codes for the major parties. The analyzed sample includes only respondents who chose one of the parties positioned on both the income differences dimension and the multiculturalism dimension. Additional demographic variables available in the DPES and used in the analysis include age, gender, education, income, social class, union membership, religious affiliation, and urbanization level.

Model Specification

Let voters in the data be indexed $i = 1, \dots, I$ and parties be indexed $j = 1, \dots, J$. Each voter takes a position on the redistribution issue, r_i , and the multiculturalism issue, m_i as well as rates the positions of all parties on the same two issues, r_{ij} and m_{ij} . When objective party positions are assumed, they are calculated by taking the median of respondents' ratings:³

$$r_{ij}^{(o)} = \text{med}(r_{ij}) \quad \text{and} \quad m_{ij}^{(o)} = \text{med}(m_{ij}). \quad (1)$$

When subjective party positions are assumed, they are simply equal to respondents' ratings:

$$r_{ij}^{(s)} = r_{ij} \quad \text{and} \quad m_{ij}^{(s)} = m_{ij}. \quad (2)$$

Independently of how party positions are defined, distances between voters and parties on the two issues can be calculated as absolute differences in their respective positions:

$$dr_{ij} = |r_i - r_{ij}^{(o/s)}| \quad \text{and} \quad dm_{ij} = |m_i - m_{ij}^{(o/s)}|. \quad (3)$$

³ We take the median as the measure of central tendency, because—unlike the arithmetic mean—it returns integer values and thus allows for zero distances between voters and parties.

Issue distances together with voter-specific non-issue factors such as age, union membership, and so on indexed $k = 1, \dots, K$ define voter i 's utility from voting for party j :

$$u_{ij} = \alpha_j + \beta_r dr_{ij} + \beta_m dm_{ij} + \sum_{k=1}^K \gamma_{jk} x_{ik}, \quad (4)$$

where α_j is the baseline utility from voting for party j , β_r is the redistribution issue coefficient, β_m is the multiculturalism issue coefficient, γ_{jk} are party-specific coefficients of the non-issue factors, and x_{ik} are the observed values of non-issue factors for voter i . For identification purposes, let $\alpha_1 = \gamma_{1k} = 0$.

Assume that voter i 's latent propensity to vote for party j incorporates both utility and random error ε_{ij} :

$$y_{ij}^* = u_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}. \quad (5)$$

Additionally, assume that the observed choice of voter i is party j if the latent propensity of voting for that party is the highest:

$$y_i = j \iff y_{ij}^* = \max(y_{i1}^*, \dots, y_{iJ}^*). \quad (6)$$

Assume also that errors are independent and have the standard type-I generalized extreme value distribution, also known as the standard Gumbel distribution. Then, probabilities of voting choices can be estimated using the conditional logit model:

$$\Pr(y_i = j) = f_i(j \mid \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}) = \frac{u_{ij}}{\sum_{j'=1}^J u_{ij'}}, \quad (7)$$

where $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_J)$, $\boldsymbol{\beta} = (\beta_r, \beta_m)$, and $\boldsymbol{\gamma} = (\gamma_{11}, \dots, \gamma_{JK})$ are the parameters of the utility function corresponding to [Equation 4](#). The model's likelihood function is given by:

$$L(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}) = \prod_{i=1}^I \prod_{j=1}^J f_i(j \mid \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})^{1(y_i=j)}, \quad (8)$$

where $\mathbf{1}(\cdot)$ is an indicator function. Then, parameters can be estimated by maximizing this likelihood function (or, equivalently, the corresponding log-likelihood function):

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}} = \operatorname{argmax} L(\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}). \quad (9)$$

Parameter estimates are used to calculate predicted utilities:

$$\hat{u}_{ij} = \hat{\alpha}_j + \hat{\beta}_r dr_{ij} + \hat{\beta}_m dm_{ij} + \sum_{k=1}^K \hat{\gamma}_{jk} x_{ik}. \quad (10)$$

Let $j = 1$ be the PvdA. The utility of voting for it given a shift one point to the right on the issue of multiculturalism is:⁴

$$\tilde{u}_{i1} = \hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\beta}_r dr_{i1} + \hat{\beta}_m |m_i - (m_{ij} + 1)| + \sum_{k=1}^K \hat{\gamma}_{1k} x_{ik}. \quad (11)$$

Since other parties are assumed to keep their issue positions, and voters' demographics also stay the same, all other utilities in the model do not change. Then, it is possible to define the predicted vote choices of voter i as the parties with the greatest utilities before and after the PvdA shift:

$$\hat{y}_i = j \Leftrightarrow \hat{u}_{ij} = \max(\hat{u}_{i1}, \hat{u}_{i2}, \dots, \hat{u}_{iJ}) \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{y}_i = j \Leftrightarrow \hat{u}_{ij} = \max(\tilde{u}_{i1}, \hat{u}_{i2}, \dots, \hat{u}_{iJ}). \quad (12)$$

Note that the only difference in the two predictions is the estimated utilities of voting for the PvdA. Predicted votes can be averaged to obtain vote shares before and after the shift:

$$\hat{\pi}_{ij} = \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I \mathbf{1}(\hat{y}_i = j) \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{\pi}_{ij} = \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I \mathbf{1}(\tilde{y}_i = j). \quad (13)$$

Finally, potential gains (or losses) from the shift for all parties can be estimated as the difference between the vote shares in the two conditions:

$$\Delta\pi_{ij} = \tilde{\pi}_{ij} - \hat{\pi}_{ij}. \quad (14)$$

⁴ If the PvdA position on multiculturalism is already at the right bound (i.e., $m_{ij} = 7$), a shift is not possible, so $\hat{u}_{i1} = \tilde{u}_{i1}$.

Positive values of $\Delta\pi_{ij}$ indicate that party j is expected to gain votes after the PvdA shift to the right on multiculturalism, and vice versa.

An important aspect of these simulations is uncertainty. Choice predictions are based on predicted utilities that are functions of estimated parameters (coefficients from the conditional logistic regression), and thus subject to sampling error. To account for this uncertainty, we use the following procedure. Instead of relying on point estimates of predicted utilities before and after the PvdA shift on the multiculturalism issue, we make 1,000 random draws from their sampling distributions. These sampling distributions are assumed to be normal (because of the corresponding property of maximum likelihood estimators) with means equal to the point estimates of predicted utilities and standard deviations equal to the respective standard errors $\hat{\sigma}_{u_{ij}}$:

$$\hat{u}_{ij}^{(1)}, \dots, \hat{u}_{ij}^{(1000)} \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(\hat{u}_{ij}, \hat{\sigma}_{u_{ij}}^2) \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{u}_{i1}^{(1)}, \dots, \tilde{u}_{i1}^{(1000)} \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(\tilde{u}_{i1}, \hat{\sigma}_{u_{i1}}^2). \quad (15)$$

Note that point estimates for predicted utilities in the two conditions are different, whereas standard errors are the same. Then, for each of random draw we obtain differences in vote shares before and after the PvdA shift to the right on multiculturalism according to [Equation 14](#). The 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles across all 1,000 draws give approximate boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals for the corresponding estimates.

Results

Following the procedure outlined above, we start from estimating the conditional logit models independently for the two specifications: with objective and subjective party positions. They predict vote choices separately across the eight elections using distances on redistribution and multiculturalism as well as non-issue factors. Results are presented as marginal effects on vote probabilities.⁵ [Figure 1](#) presents the estimated effects of issue

⁵ For regression coefficients, see Table S2 (objective specification) and Table S3 (subjective specification) in Supplementary Material.

distances between voters and the PvdA on the probability of voting for it. Unsurprisingly, voters whose positions are farther from the PvdA on both redistribution and multiculturalism are less likely to vote for it. Specifically, one additional distance unit on the seven-point scale decreases probability of voting for the PvdA by approximately 11 to 4 percentage points depending on the issue and the election year. Unsurprisingly, the effects of issue distances are generally lower when the objective specification of party positions is used. The effects of distances on the two issues are mostly comparable in magnitude, although in some elections the redistribution is somewhat more important than multiculturalism. The importance of the redistribution issue is one reason why the electoral payoff for the PvdA from shifting on the multiculturalism issue may be limited.




Figure 1. Estimated effects of issue distances on the probability of the PvdA vote

Marginal effects of the non-issue factors on the PvdA vote are presented in [Figure 2](#). These results help to understand the social profile of a social democratic voter in the Netherlands. They show that, in most elections, the probability of voting for PvdA is consistently higher among those who identify as working class and among union members but lower among Christians. The effects of age and gender are inconsistent across elections and specifications, whereas education, income, and urbanization do not show significant effects. The overall magnitudes of demographic variables are slightly higher when objective specification of party positions is used, but the differences are not significant. These findings demonstrate presence of non-issue considerations in electoral choices among Dutch voters over the studied period, especially ones related to social identities. Specifically, they suggest that the PvdA continues to draw substantial support from its traditional base of working class people and union members. The continuing importance of non-issue factors in voting for the PvdA is yet another reason why shifting on the multiculturalism issue may have limited effect on the party's vote share.

Then, we use parameter estimates from the conditional logit model to calculate predicted utilities from voting for all parties included in the data under two conditions. One uses the PvdA's actual position on the issue of multiculturalism, whereas the other assumes that the PvdA shifts to the right on that issue. These predicted utilities are used to simulate the differences in the PvdA and other Dutch parties' vote shares between the two conditions using the procedure described in the previous section. Simulated differences in vote shares across the eight elections under both objective and subjective specifications of party issue positions are presented in [Figure 3](#).⁶

The results show clear differences across the two specifications. Under the objective specification, the PvdA is able to non-trivially increase its vote share in five out of eight

⁶ For mean vote shares, see Table S4 (objective specification) and Table S5 (subjective specification) in Supplementary Material.




Figure 2. Estimated effects of non-issue factors on the probability of the PvdA vote studied elections by moving to the right on the multiculturalism issue. It primarily happens at the expense of the vote shares of center-right and right-wing parties (CDA, VVD, and PVV). The estimated PvdA gain is as much as ten percentage points in 2002.




Figure 3. Estimated changes in parties' vote shares after the PvdA shift to the right on the multiculturalism issue

However, in other years the gains are either substantially smaller (2010, 2012, 2017, and 2021) or not significant (1994, 1998, and 2006).

Under the subjective specification, all predicted differences in vote shares are not statistically significant (the simulated 95% confidence intervals include zeros). They also show substantial variation across election years. Only in two elections (2002 and 2012), the PvdA vote shares marginally increase from shifting to the right on the multiculturalism issue. In all other elections, predicted changes in the PvdA vote shares are very close to zero—moreover, in three of them (2006, 2010, and 2021) simulated shares decrease.

Discussion

In interpreting our results, it is important to be mindful of both benefits and limitations of the simulation-based approach. Importantly, it goes beyond standard regression analyses that predict vote shares of social democratic parties with their observed positions on immigration or cultural issues more broadly. Instead, simulations allow us to directly estimate how a hypothetical shift to the right on immigration may increase (or not) electoral fortunes of the PvdA—given the existing policy preferences of the Dutch electorate and the translation of those preferences into voting choices. In doing so, we account for full spatial distances between voters and parties on immigration as well as redistribution while also controlling for essential non-issue factors in voters' decisions.

At the same time, we cannot directly adjudicate which specification of the simulation model—the one featuring objective or subjective party positions—is correct. For instance, projection may cause underestimation of the electoral gains from shifting under the subjective specification. Some voters who report zero issue distances from the PvdA may do so simply because they are pre-determined to vote for the party. Therefore, they will not defect, even though the model with subjective party positions suggests that they become “farther” from the PvdA after the shift. The share of such voters in the data,

however, is difficult to assess, and the inclusion of demographic covariates should control for at least some projection effects.

In addition, our model does not consider non-voters, because their utility functions cannot be estimated within the conditional logit model. Since they are more likely to be left-authoritarian (Federico et al. 2017), this may lead us to underestimate the potential gains from appealing to that cross-section of the population. Nevertheless, we believe that such an underestimation should be minimal. General elections in the Netherlands tend to have very high turnout, close to 80% in almost all studied election years. The low electoral threshold and the resulting diversity of electoral choices is probably one of the reasons: multiple parties that appeal to different constituencies have credible chances to get parliamentary representation. It means that a substantial share of those who do not vote may be conscious abstainers. Since persuadable non-voters likely represent a relatively small subset of the electorate, the PvdA needs to attract quite a few of them to make a meaningful difference.

Conclusion

Can social democratic parties attract left-authoritarian voters by moving to the right on the issues of immigration and immigrant integration without losing too much of their existing support? To answer this question, we employ a simulation-based design.

Specifically, we estimate hypothetical election outcomes under the scenario of an existing social democratic party making a shift to the right on the issue of immigration. In doing so, we take advantage of electoral surveys in the Netherlands that have been positioning both voters and parties on the redistribution issue and the multiculturalism issue from 1994 to 2021. We start from estimating conditional logit models with two different specifications that assume, respectively, objective (median) and subjective (respondent-specific) party positions on the two issues. Then, we use the conditional logit

results to predict utilities and vote shares for all parties in the system before and after the hypothetical shift to the right on multiculturalism issue by the PvdA (Labour Party).

Our results critically depend on the model specification. Under the assumption of objective party positions, the PvdA can significantly improve its vote shares in five out of eight analyzed elections with estimated gains between two and ten percentage points. When party positions are assumed to be subjective, however, we find little to no evidence that the PvdA can gain votes from a rightward shift on the issue of immigrant integration. Methodologically, these findings once again highlight the importance of the setup in models that are used to simulate electoral results.

Substantively, our results are in line with existing studies—both observational and experimental—that are inconclusive regarding the electoral promise of a shift to the right on the issues of immigration and integration for social democrats ([Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020](#); [Chou et al. 2021](#); [Hjorth and Larsen 2022](#); [Spoon and Kluever 2020](#)). Given the uncertainty of potential electoral gains and substantial institutional costs of such a shift, it is probably not surprising that most social democratic parties in Western Europe choose the status quo. The PvdA specifically seems to opt in favor of attracting left-libertarian voters, as evidenced by it entering an electoral alliance with GroenLinks, a green and left-libertarian party, in 2021.

Some interesting questions that concern party competition and democratic representation in the two- or multi-dimensional political space still remain and can be addressed in future research. There is evidence that taking liberal positions on some cultural issues, such as LGBT rights and European integration, may be particularly beneficial to social democrats ([Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020](#); [Polacko 2023](#)). Future studies may attempt to disentangle the effects of positions on different cultural issues (e.g., immigration vs. gender equality) using experimental designs. Overall, further research on the incentives that social democratic parties face and the choices that they make can help

scholars of electoral politics to better understand the mechanisms of political representation in modern democracies.

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Supplementary Material

Contents

Table S1. Political parties present in the data

Table S2. Full results of conditional logistic regressions, objective specification

Table S3. Full results of conditional logistic regressions, subjective specification

Table S4. Full simulation results, objective specification

Table S5. Full simulation results, subjective specification

Table S1. Political parties present in the data

Party 1	
Name in English	Labour Party
Name in Dutch	Partij van de Arbeid
Abbreviation	PvdA
Family	Social democratic
Years available in the data	1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017, 2021
Party 2	
Name in English	Christian Democratic Appeal
Name in Dutch	Christen-Democratisch Appel
Abbreviation	CDA
Family	Christian democratic
Years available in the data	1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017, 2021
Party 3	
Name in English	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
Name in Dutch	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie
Abbreviation	PvdA
Family	Conservative liberal
Years available in the data	1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017, 2021
Party 4	
Name in English	Democrats 66
Name in Dutch	Democraten 66
Abbreviation	D66
Family	Social liberal
Years available in the data	1994, 1998, 2002, 2010, 2012, 2017, 2021
Party 5	
Name in English	Green Left
Name in Dutch	GroenLinks
Abbreviation	GL
Family	Green
Years available in the data	1998, 2017, 2021
Party 6	
Name in English	Reformed Political League
Name in Dutch	Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond
Abbreviation	GPV
Family	Confessional (Calvinist)
Years available in the data	1998
Party 7	
Name in English	Pim Fortuyn List
Name in Dutch	Lijst Pim Fortuyn
Abbreviation	LPF
Family	Radical right
Years available in the data	2002
Party 8	
Name in English	Christian Union
Name in Dutch	ChristenUnie
Abbreviation	CU
Family	Confessional (Calvinist)
Years available in the data	2006, 2017, 2021
Party 9	
Name in English	Socialist Party
Name in Dutch	Socialistische Partij
Abbreviation	SP
Family	Radical left
Years available in the data	2006, 2010, 2012, 2017, 2021

Party 10	
Name in English	Party for Freedom
Name in Dutch	Partij voor de Vrijheid
Abbreviation	PVV
Family	Radical right
Years available in the data	2010, 2012, 2017, 2021
Party 11	
Name in English	Forum for Democracy
Name in Dutch	Forum voor Democratie
Abbreviation	FvD
Family	Radical right
Years available in the data	2021

Table S2. Full results of conditional logistic regressions, objective specification

	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2017	2021
Redistribution distance	-0.38*** (0.04)	-0.31*** (0.03)	-0.29*** (0.04)	-0.42*** (0.03)	-0.46*** (0.05)	-0.43*** (0.04)	-0.43*** (0.03)	-0.46*** (0.03)
Multiculturalism distance	-0.26*** (0.05)	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.35*** (0.04)	-0.27*** (0.04)	-0.48*** (0.05)	-0.35*** (0.04)	-0.48*** (0.04)	-0.43*** (0.03)
CDA								
Older	0.48* (0.24)	0.84*** (0.20)	0.50* (0.22)	0.57** (0.18)	0.12 (0.27)	0.56* (0.26)	-0.96** (0.29)	0.05 (0.23)
Female	-0.14 (0.24)	-0.41* (0.20)	-0.40 (0.22)	-0.08 (0.18)	0.18 (0.27)	-0.39 (0.24)	-0.11 (0.28)	-0.27 (0.21)
Higher education	-0.66 (0.45)	-0.57* (0.28)	-0.26 (0.23)	-0.36 (0.21)	-0.75* (0.30)	-0.38 (0.29)	-0.31 (0.32)	-0.25 (0.23)
Affluent	0.19 (0.26)	-0.36 (0.24)	-0.41 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.19)	0.43 (0.29)	-0.42 (0.25)	-0.56 (0.32)	-0.14 (0.25)
Working class	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.70** (0.23)	-0.82** (0.27)	-0.91*** (0.19)	-0.23 (0.32)	-0.42 (0.27)	-0.27 (0.37)	-0.82** (0.29)
Union member	-1.34*** (0.30)	-0.73** (0.23)	-0.48* (0.22)	-0.51* (0.21)	-1.07*** (0.31)	-0.50 (0.28)	-1.00** (0.33)	-0.13 (0.25)
Christian	0.88*** (0.26)	1.56*** (0.24)	1.02*** (0.25)	1.23*** (0.22)	2.24*** (0.30)	-2.33*** (0.31)	1.45*** (0.30)	2.11*** (0.24)
Urban	-0.50* (0.24)	-0.43* (0.21)	-0.42 (0.21)	-0.35 (0.18)	-0.55* (0.27)	-0.39 (0.24)	0.03 (0.29)	-0.32 (0.22)
VVD								
Older	-0.44 (0.25)	-0.32 (0.20)	-0.19 (0.26)	0.02 (0.22)	-0.26 (0.24)	-0.26 (0.18)	-1.20*** (0.28)	-0.61** (0.21)
Female	-0.27 (0.25)	-0.75*** (0.20)	-0.21 (0.26)	-0.38 (0.22)	-0.15 (0.24)	-0.24 (0.17)	0.16 (0.27)	-0.34 (0.19)
Higher education	-0.60 (0.42)	-0.23 (0.25)	-0.12 (0.27)	0.08 (0.24)	-0.05 (0.26)	0.07 (0.19)	-0.22 (0.30)	-0.32 (0.21)
Affluent	0.52* (0.26)	0.60** (0.22)	0.31 (0.27)	0.48* (0.22)	0.53* (0.25)	0.36* (0.18)	-0.24 (0.31)	0.25 (0.22)
Working class	-1.27*** (0.33)	-1.73*** (0.29)	-2.34*** (0.51)	-1.77*** (0.30)	-0.76* (0.30)	-0.93*** (0.22)	-1.27** (0.41)	-0.92*** (0.27)
Union member	-0.82** (0.29)	-0.77*** (0.23)	-0.72** (0.27)	-0.91** (0.29)	-1.65*** (0.30)	-0.63** (0.22)	-0.91** (0.32)	-1.06*** (0.25)
Christian	0.04 (0.30)	0.50 (0.27)	0.26 (0.32)	0.25 (0.30)	-0.08 (0.26)	-0.26 (0.18)	0.39 (0.29)	0.83*** (0.22)
Urban	0.36 (0.25)	-0.11 (0.20)	0.05 (0.25)	-0.10 (0.21)	-0.40 (0.23)	-0.55** (0.18)	0.14 (0.27)	-0.34 (0.19)
D66								
Older	-0.73** (0.24)	-0.43 (0.26)	-0.30 (0.33)		0.23 (0.28)	-0.68** (0.25)	-1.67*** (0.29)	-0.60** (0.19)
Female	0.07 (0.24)	0.06 (0.26)	-0.07 (0.32)		0.08 (0.28)	-0.18 (0.23)	-0.09 (0.27)	0.19 (0.18)
Higher education	-0.24 (0.39)	0.90** (0.28)	0.42 (0.35)		0.71* (0.30)	1.07*** (0.25)	0.50 (0.31)	0.37 (0.20)
Affluent	-0.15 (0.27)	0.45 (0.28)	-0.20 (0.34)		0.56* (0.28)	0.60* (0.26)	-0.65* (0.31)	0.09 (0.21)
Working class	-0.62* (0.27)	-1.17** (0.41)	-1.67** (0.63)		-0.55 (0.38)	-1.11** (0.39)	-0.68 (0.40)	-0.92*** (0.27)
Union member	-0.42 (0.26)	-0.27 (0.29)	-0.80* (0.35)		-0.77* (0.32)	-0.44 (0.29)	-0.70* (0.31)	-0.98*** (0.24)
Christian	-0.25 (0.31)	-0.44 (0.44)	-0.59 (0.52)		-0.38 (0.32)	-0.20 (0.25)	-0.05 (0.31)	0.62** (0.22)
Urban	0.18	0.08	0.03		0.14	0.09	0.40	0.24

	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.18)
<hr/>							
GL							
Older		-0.76**				-1.34***	-1.19***
		(0.26)				(0.30)	(0.24)
Female		-0.02				0.41	0.07
		(0.25)				(0.28)	(0.23)
Higher education		0.73**				0.39	0.48
		(0.28)				(0.33)	(0.26)
Affluent		-0.15				-0.76*	-0.37
		(0.28)				(0.32)	(0.26)
Working class		-0.80*				-0.32	-0.82*
		(0.31)				(0.38)	(0.34)
Union member		-0.19				-0.15	-0.25
		(0.26)				(0.31)	(0.27)
Christian		0.22				-0.39	0.09
		(0.35)				(0.34)	(0.29)
Urban		0.12				0.93**	0.06
		(0.25)				(0.29)	(0.23)
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GPV							
Older		-0.27					
		(0.56)					
Female		-0.38					
		(0.57)					
Higher education		0.70					
		(0.65)					
Affluent		0.19					
		(0.61)					
Working class		-15.02					
		(699.54)					
Union member		-0.26					
		(0.60)					
Christian		3.86***					
		(0.79)					
Urban		-0.73					
		(0.66)					
<hr/>							
LPF							
Older			-0.02				
			(0.28)				
Female			-1.05***				
			(0.29)				
Higher education			-0.77*				
			(0.30)				
Affluent			-0.22				
			(0.33)				
Working class			-1.02**				
			(0.36)				
Union member			-1.00**				
			(0.31)				
Christian			0.03				
			(0.37)				
Urban			-0.14				
			(0.28)				
<hr/>							
CU							
Older				0.17		-1.54***	-1.19***
				(0.32)		(0.36)	(0.28)
Female				0.32		0.19	-0.20

	(0.33)		(0.35)	(0.27)
Higher education	-0.18		-0.16	0.32
	(0.37)		(0.38)	(0.29)
Affluent	-0.19		-0.58	-0.37
	(0.34)		(0.38)	(0.31)
Working class	-1.56***		-0.92	-0.91*
	(0.42)		(0.50)	(0.41)
Union member	-0.03		-0.67	-0.51
	(0.38)		(0.40)	(0.34)
Christian	2.50***		1.94***	2.60***
	(0.34)		(0.38)	(0.31)
Urban	0.06		-0.01	0.00
	(0.32)		(0.36)	(0.27)
<hr/>				
SP				
Older	-0.71***	-0.27	-0.60**	-0.67*
	(0.21)	(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.31)
Female	-0.05	0.89**	-0.08	-0.09
	(0.21)	(0.34)	(0.21)	(0.30)
Higher education	-0.26	-0.04	-0.38	-0.99**
	(0.26)	(0.38)	(0.26)	(0.36)
Affluent	-0.14	0.14	-0.47*	-0.40
	(0.23)	(0.38)	(0.22)	(0.33)
Working class	-0.25	0.45	-0.10	0.40
	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.23)	(0.36)
Union member	-0.11	-0.02	-0.11	-0.66
	(0.23)	(0.35)	(0.24)	(0.34)
Christian	-0.56	0.42	-0.37	0.10
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.22)	(0.33)
Urban	0.44*	-0.39	-0.20	0.40
	(0.20)	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.30)
<hr/>				
PVV				
Older		-1.46***	-0.61*	-1.60***
		(0.34)	(0.28)	(0.33)
Female		-0.12	-0.33	-0.53
		(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.32)
Higher education		-1.79***	-1.48**	-0.95*
		(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.40)
Affluent		0.30	0.29	-1.30***
		(0.35)	(0.27)	(0.35)
Working class		0.47	0.31	0.50
		(0.34)	(0.28)	(0.38)
Union member		-0.73*	0.16	-0.53
		(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.36)
Christian		0.80*	0.01	0.06
		(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.34)
Urban		-0.14	0.16	0.50
		(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.32)
<hr/>				
FvD				
Older				-1.42***
				(0.37)
Female				0.31
				(0.34)
Higher education				-0.39
				(0.39)
Affluent				-0.15
				(0.40)

Working class								0.51
								(0.40)
Union member								-0.43
								(0.43)
Christian								0.62
								(0.38)
Urban								0.32
								(0.34)
<hr/> <i>N</i>	2,864	5,868	3,750	5,515	5,028	7,008	8,704	17,109

Note. Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S3. Full results of conditional logistic regressions, subjective specification

	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2017	2021
Redistribution distance	-0.75*** (0.06)	-0.55*** (0.04)	-0.63*** (0.05)	-0.69*** (0.04)	-0.72*** (0.05)	-0.74*** (0.04)	-0.60*** (0.04)	-0.57*** (0.03)
Multiculturalism distance	-0.45*** (0.06)	-0.38*** (0.04)	-0.56*** (0.05)	-0.59*** (0.05)	-0.63*** (0.05)	-0.38*** (0.04)	-0.54*** (0.04)	-0.49*** (0.03)
CDA								
Older	0.69* (0.30)	1.10*** (0.23)	0.70** (0.25)	0.64** (0.21)	0.10 (0.30)	0.41 (0.30)	-0.77* (0.31)	0.21 (0.27)
Female	-0.01 (0.31)	-0.35 (0.23)	-0.05 (0.25)	-0.05 (0.22)	0.20 (0.29)	-0.43 (0.28)	-0.17 (0.30)	-0.39 (0.24)
Higher education	-0.52 (0.53)	-0.43 (0.30)	-0.45 (0.26)	-0.41 (0.25)	-0.68* (0.33)	-0.69* (0.34)	-0.69* (0.34)	-0.27 (0.26)
Affluent	0.10 (0.32)	-0.59* (0.27)	-0.28 (0.28)	-0.15 (0.23)	0.20 (0.32)	-0.44 (0.29)	-0.63 (0.34)	-0.04 (0.28)
Working class	0.34 (0.36)	-0.68* (0.27)	-0.67* (0.31)	-0.61* (0.24)	-0.04 (0.36)	-0.26 (0.32)	-0.58 (0.40)	-0.84* (0.34)
Union member	-1.32*** (0.37)	-0.84** (0.26)	-0.22 (0.25)	-0.30 (0.26)	-0.85* (0.33)	-0.51 (0.34)	-0.80* (0.35)	0.04 (0.28)
Christian	1.51*** (0.36)	1.62*** (0.27)	0.93** (0.29)	1.29*** (0.27)	2.00*** (0.32)	-2.27*** (0.37)	1.38*** (0.32)	2.04*** (0.27)
Urban	-0.70* (0.32)	-0.58* (0.24)	-0.37 (0.24)	-0.43* (0.22)	-0.72* (0.30)	-0.15 (0.29)	-0.03 (0.30)	-0.10 (0.24)
VVD								
Older	-0.35 (0.32)	-0.16 (0.23)	-0.12 (0.29)	0.24 (0.26)	-0.35 (0.27)	-0.04 (0.22)	-0.96** (0.30)	-0.65** (0.23)
Female	-0.12 (0.33)	-0.73** (0.23)	-0.08 (0.29)	-0.19 (0.26)	0.03 (0.27)	-0.34 (0.21)	0.10 (0.29)	-0.63** (0.22)
Higher education	-0.15 (0.53)	-0.22 (0.28)	-0.25 (0.31)	0.10 (0.29)	0.06 (0.29)	0.18 (0.23)	-0.53 (0.32)	-0.17 (0.24)
Affluent	0.22 (0.34)	0.36 (0.25)	0.20 (0.31)	0.51 (0.27)	0.57* (0.28)	0.14 (0.22)	-0.28 (0.33)	0.30 (0.25)
Working class	-0.97* (0.42)	-1.53*** (0.32)	-2.01*** (0.58)	-1.55*** (0.36)	-0.45 (0.34)	-1.08*** (0.27)	-1.76*** (0.45)	-0.76* (0.31)
Union member	-0.80* (0.38)	-0.90*** (0.26)	-0.59 (0.31)	-0.91** (0.34)	-1.26*** (0.33)	-0.67** (0.26)	-0.51 (0.34)	-0.94*** (0.29)
Christian	0.59 (0.41)	0.52 (0.30)	0.21 (0.36)	0.21 (0.35)	-0.19 (0.30)	-0.17 (0.22)	0.29 (0.31)	0.87*** (0.25)
Urban	0.05 (0.32)	-0.20 (0.23)	-0.04 (0.28)	-0.33 (0.26)	-0.22 (0.26)	-0.44* (0.21)	0.12 (0.29)	-0.08 (0.22)
D66								
Older	-0.65* (0.29)	-0.17 (0.28)	-0.09 (0.35)		0.10 (0.30)	-0.42 (0.28)	-1.51*** (0.30)	-0.54* (0.22)
Female	0.05 (0.28)	0.07 (0.28)	-0.01 (0.34)		0.18 (0.29)	-0.32 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.29)	0.10 (0.20)
Higher education	0.00 (0.44)	0.97** (0.30)	0.51 (0.38)		0.59 (0.31)	0.93*** (0.28)	0.21 (0.33)	0.58** (0.23)
Affluent	-0.27 (0.30)	0.37 (0.29)	-0.12 (0.36)		0.56 (0.30)	0.50 (0.29)	-0.54 (0.33)	-0.02 (0.23)
Working class	-0.34 (0.33)	-1.02* (0.43)	-1.35* (0.65)		-0.22 (0.40)	-0.95* (0.43)	-0.85* (0.43)	-0.83** (0.30)
Union member	-0.65* (0.32)	-0.53 (0.30)	-0.72* (0.37)		-0.54 (0.33)	-0.69* (0.33)	-0.49 (0.33)	-0.87*** (0.26)
Christian	0.48 (0.38)	-0.42 (0.49)	-0.51 (0.54)		-0.28 (0.34)	-0.14 (0.27)	0.06 (0.32)	0.57* (0.24)
Urban	0.02	-0.05	-0.12		0.09	0.15	0.12	0.32

	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.20)
<hr/>							
GL							
Older		-0.77**				-1.42***	-1.35***
		(0.28)				(0.32)	(0.26)
Female		-0.01				0.28	-0.07
		(0.27)				(0.31)	(0.25)
Higher education		0.73*				0.26	0.51
		(0.30)				(0.35)	(0.28)
Affluent		-0.27				-0.95**	-0.37
		(0.30)				(0.35)	(0.28)
Working class		-0.88*				-0.48	-0.62
		(0.35)				(0.43)	(0.37)
Union member		-0.37				-0.29	-0.26
		(0.29)				(0.34)	(0.30)
Christian		0.30				-0.14	0.21
		(0.39)				(0.36)	(0.31)
Urban		0.18				0.88**	0.14
		(0.27)				(0.31)	(0.25)
<hr/>							
GPV							
Older		-0.09					
		(0.62)					
Female		-0.03					
		(0.64)					
Higher education		0.66					
		(0.70)					
Affluent		-0.43					
		(0.66)					
Working class		-14.15					
		(410.18)					
Union member		-0.05					
		(0.64)					
Christian		3.23***					
		(0.82)					
Urban		-0.73					
		(0.70)					
<hr/>							
LPF							
Older			0.02				
			(0.33)				
Female			-0.87*				
			(0.35)				
Higher education			-0.73*				
			(0.35)				
Affluent			-0.21				
			(0.38)				
Working class			-0.86*				
			(0.44)				
Union member			-1.02**				
			(0.37)				
Christian			-0.08				
			(0.43)				
Urban			-0.14				
			(0.33)				
<hr/>							
CU							
Older			0.45			-1.67***	-1.24***
			(0.37)			(0.39)	(0.31)
Female			0.86*			0.35	-0.20

	(0.39)			(0.38)	(0.30)
Higher education	-0.22			-0.41	0.42
	(0.41)			(0.42)	(0.32)
Affluent	-0.37			-0.65	-0.24
	(0.40)			(0.42)	(0.34)
Working class	-2.14***			-0.74	-0.79
	(0.56)			(0.55)	(0.46)
Union member	-0.03			-0.42	-0.52
	(0.45)			(0.44)	(0.38)
Christian	2.31***			2.01***	2.42***
	(0.40)			(0.42)	(0.34)
Urban	0.00			-0.21	0.03
	(0.39)			(0.40)	(0.30)
<hr/>					
SP					
Older	-0.52*	-0.33	-0.75**	-0.56	-0.25
	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.28)
Female	0.04	0.90*	-0.14	-0.20	-0.16
	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.25)
Higher education	-0.31	-0.34	-0.34	-1.25**	-0.48
	(0.29)	(0.42)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.28)
Affluent	-0.34	0.54	-0.29	-0.34	-0.81*
	(0.26)	(0.41)	(0.26)	(0.36)	(0.36)
Working class	-0.20	0.85*	0.01	0.24	0.31
	(0.27)	(0.40)	(0.27)	(0.40)	(0.28)
Union member	-0.12	0.15	-0.02	-0.55	-0.53
	(0.27)	(0.38)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.29)
Christian	-0.59	0.59	-0.09	0.09	0.55
	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.29)
Urban	0.36	-0.51	-0.23	0.27	-0.24
	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.25)
<hr/>					
PVV					
Older		-1.41***	0.19	-1.08**	-0.76*
		(0.38)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.30)
Female		0.15	-0.32	-0.74*	-0.51
		(0.36)	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.29)
Higher education		-1.52**	-1.29**	-1.12*	-1.16***
		(0.52)	(0.49)	(0.44)	(0.34)
Affluent		0.48	-0.29	-1.16**	-0.43
		(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.35)
Working class		0.41	-0.20	0.24	-0.31
		(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.43)	(0.33)
Union member		-0.41	0.28	-0.19	-0.47
		(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.34)
Christian		0.50	0.19	0.15	0.86**
		(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.31)
Urban		-0.27	0.03	0.43	0.24
		(0.36)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.28)
<hr/>					
FvD					
Older					-1.16**
					(0.43)
Female					0.37
					(0.40)
Higher education					0.38
					(0.46)
Affluent					-0.23
					(0.46)

Working class								0.22
								(0.50)
Union member								-0.17
								(0.48)
Christian								0.61
								(0.44)
Urban								0.03
								(0.41)
<hr/> <i>N</i>	2,294	4,747	3,370	4,463	4,630	5,563	7,165	13,836

Note. Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S4. Full simulation results, objective specification

Party	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2017	2021
PvdA								
Predicted	37.9 [36.4, 39.4]	34.5 [32.8, 36.2]	33.2 [31.7, 34.6]	31 [29.5, 32.4]	27.8 [26.6, 29.1]	39.4 [38.1, 40.6]	5.5 [4.6, 6.2]	4.5 [3.9, 5]
Simulated	39.2 [37.5, 40.8]	36.5 [34.6, 38.3]	43 [41.5, 44.7]	32.4 [31, 33.8]	33.2 [31.6, 34.8]	44.7 [43.5, 46]	6.7 [5.8, 7.6]	7.3 [6.7, 8]
Difference	1.3 [-0.9, 3.5]	2 [-0.7, 4.5]	9.8 [7.7, 11.9]	1.5 [-0.4, 3.5]	5.3 [3.4, 7.3]	5.3 [3.5, 7.1]	1.3 [0.1, 2.4]	2.8 [2, 3.7]
CDA								
Predicted	20.1 [18.5, 21.8]	17.2 [15.8, 18.5]	42.4 [40.5, 44.2]	42.2 [40.8, 43.7]	20.5 [19.2, 22]	7.5 [6.5, 8.5]	14.2 [12.8, 15.6]	11 [10.1, 12]
Simulated	19.1 [17.3, 20.8]	15.9 [14.7, 17.2]	36 [34.1, 37.9]	39.9 [38.4, 41.3]	19.4 [17.9, 20.7]	6.5 [5.6, 7.4]	13.6 [12.1, 15.2]	10.7 [9.8, 11.6]
Difference	-1 [-3.5, 1.2]	-1.2 [-3.1, 0.7]	-6.4 [-9, -3.7]	-2.2 [-4.3, -0.2]	-1.1 [-3.2, 0.8]	-0.9 [-2.3, 0.2]	-0.6 [-2.8, 1.5]	-0.4 [-1.7, 0.9]
VVD								
Predicted	26.3 [24.8, 28]	31 [29.7, 32.4]	15.6 [14.2, 17]	14.6 [13.6, 15.7]	36.9 [35.1, 38.6]	42.7 [41.2, 44.1]	27.3 [25.6, 29]	33.4 [32.4, 34.6]
Simulated	25.2 [23.7, 26.6]	28 [26.6, 29.4]	12.8 [11.4, 14.3]	14.3 [13.2, 15.4]	33.7 [31.9, 35.5]	38.4 [36.9, 39.8]	26.2 [24.4, 27.7]	32.1 [31, 33.3]
Difference	-1.1 [-3.3, 1]	-3.1 [-4.9, -1]	-2.8 [-4.8, -0.7]	-0.3 [-1.9, 1.3]	-3.2 [-5.4, -0.6]	-4.2 [-6.2, -2.3]	-1.1 [-3.4, 1.4]	-1.3 [-3, 0.3]
D66								
Predicted	15.7 [14, 17.3]	3.7 [2.9, 4.5]	1.6 [1, 2.3]		5.7 [4.6, 6.7]	5 [4.2, 5.9]	18.3 [16.7, 19.9]	31.7 [30.5, 32.7]
Simulated	16.6 [14.9, 18.5]	3.9 [3.2, 4.7]	2.4 [1.6, 3.1]		7.1 [5.9, 8.2]	6.4 [5.5, 7.3]	18.4 [16.8, 20]	31.6 [30.5, 32.8]
Difference	0.9 [-1.6, 3.3]	0.2 [-1, 1.4]	0.7 [-0.3, 1.7]		1.4 [-0.3, 2.9]	1.3 [0.1, 2.5]	0.1 [-2.1, 2.5]	0 [-1.6, 1.7]
GL								
Predicted		1.9 [1.2, 2.6]					11.6 [10.5, 12.9]	2.1 [1.6, 2.6]
Simulated		3.9 [3.1, 4.8]					12.8 [11.6, 14.1]	2.3 [1.7, 2.8]
Difference		2.1 [1.1, 3.1]					1.2 [-0.6, 2.8]	0.2 [-0.6, 0.8]
GPV								
Predicted		11.8 [10.3, 13.4]						

Simulated	11.8				
Difference	[10.3, 13.3]				
	0				
	[-2.1, 2.1]				
LPF					
Predicted	7.3				
	[6.1, 8.5]				
Simulated	5.9				
	[4.8, 7]				
Difference	-1.4				
	[-2.9, 0.2]				
CU					
Predicted	1.4	3	1.3		
	[0.8, 1.9]	[2.2, 3.9]	[0.9, 1.7]		
Simulated	1.5	3.1	1.3		
	[0.9, 2]	[2.3, 4]	[0.9, 1.7]		
Difference	0.1	0.2	0		
	[-0.7, 0.8]	[-1, 1.3]	[-0.6, 0.6]		
SP					
Predicted	11	1.4	2.6	9.8	8.6
	[10, 12.1]	[0.8, 2.1]	[1.9, 3.4]	[8.7, 11]	[7.8, 9.4]
Simulated	12	1.5	2.2	9.4	8.3
	[11, 13]	[0.8, 2.2]	[1.5, 2.8]	[8.3, 10.6]	[7.6, 8.9]
Difference	1	0.1	-0.4	-0.5	-0.4
	[-0.6, 2.3]	[-0.8, 1]	[-1.4, 0.5]	[-2.1, 1.2]	[-1.4, 0.7]
PVV					
Predicted		7.8	3	10.4	7
		[6.8, 8.8]	[2.3, 3.5]	[9.3, 11.5]	[6.4, 7.7]
Simulated		5.3	1.9	9.9	6.2
		[4.5, 6.3]	[1.4, 2.4]	[8.7, 11.1]	[5.5, 6.8]
Difference		-2.4	-1.1	-0.5	-0.8
		[-3.8, -1.1]	[-1.9, -0.2]	[-2.1, 1.2]	[-1.8, 0.2]
FvD					
Predicted					0.4
					[0.2, 0.6]
Simulated					0.3
					[0.1, 0.6]
Difference					-0.1
					[-0.4, 0.3]

Note. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in brackets

Table S5. Full simulation results, subjective specification

Party	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2012	2017	2021
PvdA								
Predicted	34.9	33.8	34.7	29	27.9	35.3	7.2	8.1
	[33.4, 36.5]	[32.1, 35.3]	[33.3, 36.1]	[27.8, 30.1]	[26.6, 29.3]	[33.8, 36.6]	[6.2, 8.3]	[7.3, 9.1]
Simulated	35.7	34.6	36.6	28.4	27	37.2	7.2	7.6
	[34.2, 37.2]	[32.9, 36.2]	[35.1, 38]	[27.2, 29.5]	[25.6, 28.2]	[35.7, 38.6]	[6.2, 8.2]	[6.7, 8.4]
Difference	0.8	0.8	1.9	-0.5	-0.9	1.9	0	-0.6
	[-1.5, 3.1]	[-1.5, 3.3]	[-0.1, 3.8]	[-2, 1.2]	[-2.8, 1]	[-0.1, 4]	[-1.5, 1.4]	[-1.8, 0.6]
CDA								
Predicted	19.7	19	36.9	37.2	18.5	8.5	15.5	11.5
	[18, 21.4]	[17.6, 20.5]	[35.1, 38.4]	[35.7, 38.7]	[17.3, 19.8]	[7.6, 9.5]	[14.1, 17.1]	[10.7, 12.3]
Simulated	19.4	18.2	35.7	36.4	18.6	8.1	15.4	11.4
	[17.7, 21.1]	[16.8, 19.5]	[34, 37.4]	[35, 37.9]	[17.5, 19.9]	[7.1, 9.1]	[14, 16.8]	[10.6, 12.2]
Difference	-0.3	-0.8	-1.2	-0.7	0.2	-0.4	-0.1	-0.1
	[-2.6, 2]	[-2.8, 1.2]	[-3.6, 1.4]	[-2.8, 1.2]	[-1.5, 1.8]	[-1.8, 1]	[-2.1, 1.9]	[-1.2, 1]
VVD								
Predicted	28.1	31.8	17.1	19.7	35	38.5	28.4	31.9
	[26.5, 29.8]	[30.3, 33.1]	[15.8, 18.4]	[18.6, 20.8]	[33.7, 36.4]	[37.3, 39.7]	[27.1, 29.6]	[31.1, 32.9]
Simulated	27.5	30.9	16.6	19.4	34.3	37.7	28.4	31.8
	[26.1, 29.2]	[29.5, 32.3]	[15.3, 17.8]	[18.3, 20.4]	[32.9, 35.8]	[36.4, 39.1]	[27.2, 29.5]	[30.9, 32.6]
Difference	-0.7	-0.9	-0.5	-0.2	-0.7	-0.8	0	-0.2
	[-3, 1.6]	[-2.8, 1.1]	[-2.4, 1.5]	[-1.9, 1.3]	[-2.8, 1.4]	[-2.5, 1]	[-1.6, 1.7]	[-1.4, 1]
D66								
Predicted	22.5	5.6	4.2		9.1	10.2	21.6	30.3
	[20.7, 24.5]	[4.6, 6.6]	[3.2, 5.1]		[7.8, 10.4]	[9.1, 11.3]	[20, 23.2]	[29.2, 31.3]
Simulated	22.7	5.7	4.7		10.6	9.8	21.5	30.6
	[20.9, 24.6]	[4.7, 6.7]	[3.8, 5.7]		[9.3, 11.8]	[8.7, 10.9]	[20, 23.1]	[29.5, 31.7]
Difference	0.2	0.1	0.5		1.5	-0.3	-0.1	0.4
	[-2.4, 2.9]	[-1.4, 1.5]	[-0.8, 1.9]		[-0.3, 3.1]	[-1.9, 1.3]	[-2.3, 2.1]	[-1.1, 1.9]
GL								
Predicted		6.7					12.6	4.4
		[5.6, 7.9]					[11.2, 13.8]	[3.7, 5]
Simulated		7.5					12.9	4.7
		[6.4, 8.6]					[11.7, 14.1]	[4.1, 5.4]
Difference		0.9					0.3	0.4
		[-0.7, 2.3]					[-1.5, 2.2]	[-0.6, 1.2]
GPV								
Predicted		10.6						
		[8.8, 12.7]						

Simulated	10.6				
Difference	-0.1				
	[8.6, 12.5]				
	[-2.9, 2.5]				
LPF					
Predicted	11				
	[9.9, 12.1]				
Simulated	10.1				
Difference	-0.9				
	[-2.6, 1]				
CU					
Predicted	3.4	4.7	2.8		
	[2.5, 4.4]	[3.7, 5.9]	[2.3, 3.3]		
Simulated	3.5	4.7	2.8		
	[2.7, 4.4]	[3.7, 5.9]	[2.3, 3.4]		
Difference	0.1	0	0		
	[-1.1, 1.5]	[-1.5, 1.5]	[-0.7, 0.7]		
SP					
Predicted	16.3	3.4	7.7	10.3	7.7
	[15, 17.6]	[2.6, 4.3]	[6.7, 8.7]	[9, 11.6]	[6.8, 8.5]
Simulated	17.9	4.2	7.5	10.2	8
	[16.7, 19]	[3.4, 5.2]	[6.6, 8.6]	[9, 11.5]	[7.2, 8.7]
Difference	1.6	0.8	-0.2	-0.1	0.3
	[-0.1, 3.3]	[-0.3, 2.1]	[-1.6, 1.2]	[-1.8, 1.5]	[-0.8, 1.3]
PVV					
Predicted		8.7	3.6	10.9	8.3
		[7.6, 9.6]	[2.8, 4.3]	[9.8, 12.1]	[7.6, 8.9]
Simulated		7.8	3.4	10.8	8.1
		[6.7, 8.9]	[2.8, 4.1]	[9.7, 12.1]	[7.4, 8.7]
Difference		-0.8	-0.2	-0.1	-0.2
		[-2.3, 0.6]	[-1.1, 0.8]	[-1.6, 1.5]	[-1, 0.8]
FvD					
Predicted					0.9
					[0.6, 1.3]
Simulated					0.9
					[0.5, 1.3]
Difference					0
					[-0.6, 0.6]

Note. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in brackets